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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
STATE V. THOMAS: A DISTRIBUTOR OF HEROIN MAY BE 
CONVICTED OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER FOR THE 
FATAL OVERDOSE OF A BUYER UPON A FINDING OF GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE AND CAUSATION. 
 
By: Katherine Burgess 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a distributor of heroin may 
be convicted of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter if there is 
sufficient evidence to prove that the distributor’s conduct was both the actual 
and legal cause of a buyer’s fatal overdose. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 
139, 211 A.3d 274, 278 (Md. 2019).  The evidence must be reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis to determine the degree of gross negligence required and 
whether a sufficient causal connection exists between such gross negligence 
and the fatal overdose of a buyer. Id. at 167, 211 A.3d at 294.  The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court did not err in finding Thomas’s 
conduct sufficient to establish gross negligence and causation, affirming the 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on the inherent dangers of 
distributing and consuming heroin, and the circumstances of this transaction. 
Id. at 180, 211 A.3d at 301.  
     On the morning of June 26, 2015, Colton Matrey (“Matrey”) was found 
deceased in the bathroom of his residence in Worcester County, Maryland.  
Responding officer Detective Jeff Johns (“Johns”) observed four bags on and 
around Matrey’s person, each bag labeled “banshee.”  After speaking with 
Matrey’s family, Johns learned that Matrey had been abusing heroin for over 
four years.  An investigation of Matrey’s cell phone call log revealed a total 
of 27 outgoing phone calls and several text messages to Patrick Thomas 
(“Thomas”) in a 20-minute window around midnight on June 25.  A search 
of Thomas’ person and residence revealed 60 bags identical to those found in 
Matrey’s possession, containing a total of 13.10 grams of heroin.  
     In his voluntary statements made to police, Thomas stated that he had been 
selling “banshee” for over a month and that he personally consumed about 
12 bags of heroin a day, dosed in quantities of 4 bags at a time.  Thomas 
admitted that he had sold heroin to Matrey on more than one occasion and 
that he sold Matrey four bags of “banshee” around midnight on June 26, 2015.  
Upon learning of Matrey’s death the night of the sale, Thomas expressed 
dismay: “He [Matrey] couldn’t have overdosed off what I sold him. I only 
sold him four bags.”  Thomas stated that he felt bad, acknowledging that he 
would have to live with this incident on his conscience.   
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     The Circuit Court for Worcester County convicted Thomas of distribution 
of heroin, reckless endangerment, and involuntary manslaughter based on a 
theory of gross negligence.  Thomas appealed to the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland on the basis that the evidence did not support a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter.  On appeal, the court held that the State did not 
provide sufficient evidence of gross negligence.  Additionally, the court held 
that there was a break in the causal chain between Thomas’s actions and 
Matrey’s death was broken, and as a result, Thomas was not the “but for” 
cause of death.  The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.  
     The question presented to the Court of Appeals of Maryland was whether 
the distribution of heroin may establish the requisite gross negligence to 
support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.  Thomas, 464 Md. at 160-
61, 211 A.3d at 290.  Maryland precedent has “equated ‘gross negligence’ 
with a ‘wanton and reckless disregard’” and involving a “‘high degree of risk’ 
to human life.” Id. at 153, 211 A.3d at 286 (citing Charles E. Moylan, Jr., 
Criminal Homicide Law § 12.24 at 226 (2018); Maryland Pattern Criminal 
Jury Instructions § 4:17.8 at 699 (2018)).  The court calls for an objective 
reading of the facts to determine the degree of negligence needed to establish 
the mens rea of gross negligence manslaughter. Thomas, 464 Md. at 160, 211 
A.3d at 289.   
     In reaching its decision, the court reviewed findings from the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the North Carolina Court of Appeals on 
the issue of whether the distribution of intoxicating substances can support a 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter under a gross negligence theory. 
Thomas, 464 Md. at 164-65, 211 A.3d at 292-93.  In line with these 
jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Thomas’ actions 
were wanton and reckless because of the dangers inherent in the distribution 
and consumption of heroin of unknown potency carrying with it a high degree 
of risk to human life. Id. at 164-65, 169, 211 A.3d at 292-93, 295.   
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to create a per se ruling 
deeming all heroin distribution that results in a fatality as gross negligence. 
Thomas, 464 Md. at 167, 211 A.3d at 294.  Rather, Maryland courts must 
consider the totality of the circumstances of the parties and the sale. Id. at 
167, 211 A.3d at 294.  Here, the court considered Matrey’s history of drug 
use and dealings with Thomas, the urgency with which and unusual hour 
Matrey contacted Thomas, Thomas’s history of drug use and distribution, and 
his knowledge of the potential risks to human life of heroin use. Id. at 168-
170, 211 A.3d at 294-96.  The court found that Thomas was aware of the 
foreseeable consequences of heroin use and of Matrey’s desperation, based 
on the number of attempts to contact Thomas. Id. at 169-71, 211 A.3d at 295-
96.  However, he completed the sale of heroin that resulted in Matrey’s fatal 
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overdose. Id. at 169-71, 211 A.3d at 295-96.  Therefore, the evidence 
reviewed by the trial court was sufficient to find Thomas’ conduct indicative 
of a wanton and reckless disregard for human life, constituting gross 
negligence. Id. at 172, 211 A.3d at 297. 
     For a conviction of involuntary manslaughter to stand, the State must 
show that the distributor was both the factual and legal cause of death. 
Thomas, 464 Md. at 173, 211 A.3d at 297.  The State is not required to show 
that the heroin was an independent cause of death, only that Matrey’s death 
would not have occurred ‘but for’ “the heroin Thomas supplied.” Id. at 177-
79, 211 A.3d at 300-01.  The court determined that the concentration of 
narcotics found in Matrey’s blood at the time of death amounted to a lethal 
dose. Id. at 179, 211 A.3d at 300. This finding negates the argument by 
Thomas that Matrey’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of 0.08% was a 
contributing factor to his death. Id. at 177, 211 A.3d at 300.  The court 
explains that such a percentage does not constitute a lethal dose of alcohol, 
considering that Maryland’s BAC legal limit for driving is 0.08%. Id.  
Instead, the court stated, the main issue is whether or not Matrey’s death 
would have occurred if not for Thomas’ conduct. Id.                
     The determination of legal causation depends on the foreseeability of the 
consequences of the distributor’s actions judged by a reasonable person 
standard. Thomas, 464 Md. at 178-79, 211 A.3d at 300-01.  Death is not 
required to be foreseen by the distributor, it only needs to be rationally related 
to the distributor’s conduct.  Id. at 179, 211 A.3d at 301.  The court 
determined that Matrey’s intervening conduct of consuming all four bags of 
heroin does not negate Thomas’ criminal liability as such conduct was 
reasonably foreseeable following the sale. Id. at 179, 211 A.3d at 301 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 556 N.E.2d 973 at 980 (1990)).  
The court stated that Matrey’s contributory negligence is not a valid defense 
to involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 179, 211 A.3d at 301. 
     The dissenting opinion rejects the finding of a sufficient causal connection 
between the sale of heroin and Matrey’s death. Thomas, 464 Md. at 181, 211 
A.3d at 302.  Maryland precedent that has applied the felony murder doctrine 
has found defendants culpable when the commission of the felony and death 
are a part of a single continuous transaction. Id. at 182, 211 A.3d at 302-03.  
In the present case, the sale and subsequent use and overdose are entirely 
separate by time, place and participation. Id. at 183, 211 A.3d at 303-04.  
Thomas was not present, and he did not prepare the dose or inject Matrey, 
nor was he afforded the opportunity to save him. Id.  The dissent also 
proposes that the finding of tramadol (an opioid analgesic that like heroin, 
converts into free morphine in the bloodstream when metabolized) in 
Matrey’s bedroom contributes to the uncertainty of the cause of death. Id. at 
184, 211 A.3d at 304.  The dissent states that classifying Thomas’ actions of 
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distributing heroin as involuntary manslaughter is a policy concern that 
should be dealt with by the Maryland General Assembly, not judges. Id. at 
187, 211 A.3d at 306. 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a distributor of heroin is guilty 
of involuntary manslaughter for the death of a buyer upon a sufficient 
showing of gross negligence and causation.  This cased has paved the way to 
prosecuting small time distributors contributing to the opioid and heroin 
epidemic in Maryland.  However, the potential flood of prosecutions that may 
be brought because of many opioid-related deaths could pose a problem for 
Maryland’s State’s Attorney’s Office with regard to the increased caseload 
and manpower required to investigate these highly fact-specific incidents.  
The question remains whether this holding will deter small-time distributors 
from engaging in the sale of heroin and other intoxicating substances because 
of the burden on the State to prove the requisite circumstances that push the 
transaction past a mere distribution.  
